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CREATED 4/29/2012

WARNING: This site deals only with the corporate corruption of science, and makes no inference about the motives or activities of individuals involved.
    There are many reasons why individuals become embroiled in corporate corruption activities - from political zealotry to over-enthusiastic activism; from gullibility to greed.
    Please read the OVERVIEW carefully, and make up your own mind.


Smoking-Gun docs.

David Kalson
Stephen J Caldeira
James F ('Jim') Plante
E Bruce Harrison
Patricia de Stacy Harrison
M Ward Hubbell
Faustin J Solon
George Carlo (Pt 1)
Manhattan Institute
Steve Milloy (Pt 1)
Tom Borelli
Michael Fumento
Johns Manville Corp
E Bruce Harrison Co
Hill & Knowlton
Dow Chemicals
Dilenschneider Group
Irving J Selikoff
Dianne N Swetonic




Matthew M ('Matt') Swetonic    

(misspelled Swetionic)

Matt Swetonic was a life-long lobbyist and public relations disinformation specialist working in the area of health and human misery. He became a specialist in this area while working through E Bruce Harrison Co (the original environmental 'backlash' PR organisation funded by the chemical industry to denigrate Rachel Carson and her 'Silent Spring' theseis.

Later he worked through EBH for Johns Manville at the Asbestos Information Center, then later for Dow Chemicals on the Agent Orange problem, and for Philip Morris, and then for RJ Reynolds in promoting its 'Premier' cigarette.

E Bruce Harrison was taken over successively by Ruder & Finn, then by Hill & Knowlton, and more recently by the WPP Group. And in the late 1990s Swetonic shifted to the Dilenschneider Group (running their New York office)

Background to Asbestos/Tobacco rivalry:
In the early 1970s the tobacco industry, the asbestos companies and the chemical manufacturers were all trying to lay the blame on each other for the spate of environmentally-caused cancers, which were then being identified by scientists like Dr Irving J Selikoff.

In litigation around the world they regularly tried to lay the blame on the other industries for causing the cancers. Mesothelioma, however, was generally assumed to be solely caused by asbestos.

Later, there was a coming together of the asbestos and tobacco interests when they realised that each was undercutting the credibility of the other. Eventually, an agreement was reached to cooperate in defending these cases, rather than apportioning the blame. Later still they were organised via the Business RoundTable (together with the Chemical Manufacturers and the Energy companies) into coalitions, and all of the industries started to work together to attack the use of class-actions, and limit the size of punative damages. ('tort-reform')

Matt Swetonic is particularly interesting because he worked at a high level for Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds in tobacco, for Johns Manville in asbestos, and for Dow Chemicals on Agent Orange. So his correspondence should give us a good indication of how and when these cooperative arrangments were made.


It is generally assumed that Dianna Swetonic was Matt's wife, but no one has yet established this with certainty. It could well be a sister.
    There is also a S Swetonic listed regularly in 1970's cc lists for Philip Morris marketing.

Some key documents

• There is also Dianne N. Swetonic of Phillip Morris, and later Lorillard Market Research There are 398 documents dealing with the two Swetonics in the tobacco archive files.[At a later search only were 392 found]

    Dianne N Swetonic (probably wife or sister) ran a polling/market research division of Philip Morris in New York in 1970-72. In 1973 she appears to have swapped over to the competitor Lorillard and become a top marketing executive.

1972: A later document says that Matt Swetonic made public statements on behalf of Johns-Manville and testified before the US Department of Labor.

    Swetonic later says that he worked directly with the OSHA administrator, Jerry Scannell, at this time 'on the asbestos standard')

1972 Oct 16: This letter is from Leonard Zahn, a scientific lobbyist who worked for the tobacco industry (this was in their files) through Hill & Knowlton, and later with his own company (with his wife Hilda). Zahn writes to Faustin Solon, VP of Johns-Manville (Swetonic is ccd) regarding an article by Dr Irving Selikoff concerning asbestos pollution.
[Selikoff was the most important public health researcher working on asbestos during the 1970s and 80s]

"Being in an beneficent mood and also irritated at the obvious manipulation of the press by Selikoff et al, I tried to reach Matt Swetonic to inform him about the impact, I knew would result from Selikoff's charges,

    Failing to get him, I called you and ended up talking with Walter Goodwin in your department.

[This came from the files of Council for Tobacco Research. ]
At this time (in the period 1971-72 on) Matt Swetonic appears to be working full time (through H&K) for the Asbestos Information Association. He does not then appear to be working for tobacco — although Hill & Knowlton and Zahn certainly were.

1973 Jan 21: New York Times magazine "Asbestos, the saver of lives, has a deadly side."

Matt Swetonic, Secretary of the Asbestos Information Service, a New York health data distribution center funded by the industry, says, "There has been considerable controversy with Selikoff not so much on the effects of asbestos, but on the best means to control it and what sort of levels are necessary to control various asbestos diseases."

    Industry people, says Swetonic, believe that the perils of the insulation workers who face periodic massive doses of asbestos-laden air — are too often confused with what industry contends are the manageable low-level exposures of the asbestos manufacturing factories.
Labor Secretary James Hodgson left the air safety limit at 5 fibres per cc, rather than reducing them to the advisory level of 2 fibres per ccc.
[While some manufactories may have had low exposure levels, the mining, transporting, storing and handling of raw asbestos was criminally negligent in most cases.]

1973 Apr: Asbestos and Health, Information File [Tobacco Institute files] This is a long document created by the Asbestos Information Association.

Swetonic carried the title Executive Secretary, Asbestos Information Association, while working for Johns Manville via H&K/EBH.

Part I   Part II   Part III   Part IV   Part V

Aug 1979: Swetonic shifts back to Hill & Knowlton full-time.

1976 Nov: 7-8 Leonard Zahn specialised in attending scientific conferences, identifying potential tame scientist, lobbying, and generally reporting on scientific findings. The letter deals with Vinyl Chloride in a conference of the Air Pollution Control Assoc (chemical mfg lobby group) Specialty conference on "toxic substances in the air environment," Boston,

    The tobacco and asbestos industries were interested in identifying any other possible cause of lung cancer at this time. This was before the formation of the coalition. [This is CTR document] [They are interested in this chemical because vinyl chloride traces were found in tobacco smoke and believed to be both mutagenic and carcinogenic]


1979 Aug 15: This memo is to lawyers, Bill Shinn, David Hardy and Bob Northrip — who are all from the most notorious tobacco legal firm, Shook Hardy & Bacon of Kansas City. SH&B did most of the tobacco industry's secret payments to scientists, bribed witnesses and politicians, and ran many of their scientific defence cases. They were also involved in asbestos cases, because smokers with lung-cancer often sued both asbestos and cigarette companies.

    The memo suggests that in August 1979, the asbestos and tobacco lobby were still not working closely together on science corruption. In this case, the asbestos industry was countering Selikoff who had announced that asbestos workers who smoked were almost certain to get lung cancer. The Dr Paul Kotin mentioned later became a major tobacco scientist and supporter.

    The memo gives details of Swetonic's background (part of Johns-Manville hierarchy) It also gives dates for knowledge of synergistic relationship between tobacco and asbestos cancers.

  • Ron Motley is a well-known anti-smoking plaintiff lawyer who also sued the asbestos industry on behalf it its victims. He often sets up class actions and he was involved in the massive tobacco settlement action.
  • J-M = Johns Manville, the biggest of the asbestos companies
  • ATLA = American Trial Lawyers Association. These are plaintiff counsels - hated by the tobacco industry

1985: Hill & Knowlton took over the promotion of the future Premier cigarette for RJ Reynolds from Burson-Marsteller

1985: RJ Reynolds Litigation PR Plan for 1985, which appears to be the first time H&K were working for RJR, as distinct from working for the joint tobacco lobby (CTR). This a fairly standard H&K proposal. Not dealing with scientific stuff.

    Swetonic is involved for the next few years in monitoring and marketing for the new (Projects Alpha, SPA and Q) nicotine delivery products which were later called 'Premium' (essentially tubes with heated taste beads and nicotine)

It is certain that the upcoming product liability trials in which R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company will be engaged will attract extensive media attention.

    The following is presented as a basic plan intended to provide Reynolds Tobacco with the means of expressing its views and to the extent possible attempting to counter the negative public perceptions of the company that will be generated by plaintiff's arguments. Those involved will be
  • Jim Fyock : Group PR Director at RJR International
  • Ron Sustana, VP Corporate Relations RJRI
  • Harold Henderson, general counsel RJRI
  • David Fishel : VP-PR, RJR Tobacco
  • Matt Swetonic, Senior VP, Hill & Knowlton
  • James Callaghan, Senior VP, Hill & Knowlton
  • Betsy Annese, PR Manager, RJRT

1987 Sep 2: "Exposure List" at RJR Those PR Consultants from H&K: Tim V Comer, Phillip Fried, George Glezn, Penn E Ell, Matt M Swetonic, Donald Chleaton, Susan L Hullin, Patrick Muldowney.

    These are the names of those who are able to see secret documents about Project Q.

1988 March 21: Matt Swetonic advises Herb Osmon (VP of Public Policy at RJR) that he is planning a highly secret meeting with the Executive Editor of the Reader's Digest to sell him on the idea of the new Premier 'safe' cigarette'.

    The Reader's Digest wouldn't normally carry cigarette advertising, and it had consistently run a vigorous anti-smoking policy — so Matt thought their endorsement would be a real marketing coup. He would encourage them to contact Ernst Wynder at the American Health Foundation, which was doing work for RJR. (He got an OK)

    This was, of course, entirely against the "gentleman's agreement" they had with the other tobacco companies. [Alpha was another codename for the Premier cigarette (they regularly changed code names in case documents leaked.)]

    When the Premier project collapse around 1989-90, Swetonic was shifted on to the ETS (Environmental Tobacco Smoke) issue which proved to be the killer for the tobacco industry.

1988 Sept: Swetonic and David Kalson, both Scientific Advisors from Hill & Knowlton, are running basic training sessions for RJ Reynolds executives to familiarise them with how an editorial board functions. They are also training and rehearsing them on video for the Premier launch. [David Kalson had been the PR manager for the American Institute of Phyiscs and had become a H&K Science Advisor]

    The outcome was an editorial in the New York Times.

1988 Nov 22: Matt Swetonic has sent Betsy Annese at RJR a draft op-ed piece for the St Louis Post Dispatch.

We believe Wally [Hayes] should be the "author" of the piece. If not him, then Sam.

    If at all possible, because of the short week, I would-like to get the final copy to Dana Spitzer in our St. Louis office by Wednesday.

    Later he sends a revised version plus another op-ed.

1988 Nov 28: Project Q (the promotion of Premier cigarette) is going badly, and Swetonic is in no doubt that the problem lies with the negative attitude of Reynolds.

1989 Feb 27: Matt Swetonic, Doug Hearle and Sue Hullins, all of Hill & Knowlton, prepared this draft document for RJ Reynolds on the "PR woes of the Premier cigarette." It is a historical outline of their work.

1989 Feb 28: KKR, the new junk-bond/LBO firm which had taken control of RJ Reynolds, dumped the Premier cigarette project overnight.

1990 Nov 13: Swetonic is being sent the results of air-quality samplying in offices and restaurants in Sacramento, California. RJ Reynolds (Guy Oldaker) had become the industry experts in the use of Portable Air Sampling System (PASS) equipment, and so provided a service to local business and restaurant organisations fighting against public and workplace smoking bans.

We collected four samples in offices where smoking was permitted. Results show that an occupant would have to spend on average more than 120 hours to be exposed to the nicotine equivalent of one cigarette. As was the case for the restaurant result, this result also is biased toward a higher exposure level. Noteworthy is one sample showing the highest level of nicotine. We collected this sample in an office occupied only by two persons both smokers. By contrast, the second highest result was about eight times less.
The trick, of course, was in the measurement and in the knowledge of the media and general public. Nicotine is not the problem with indoor air quality, because it is chemically active and quickly breaks down. Nor was nicotine implicated in lung-cancer and most other ETS-related health problems. So, such statements can be true and also misleading.

1990 Nov 15: Swetonic is being ccd [Along with David Kalson] by H&K with its memo on an anti-smoking "Teach In/Cigarettes in the Harlem Community" -

1990 Dec 13: Swetonic and Kalson advise Betsy Annese (PR at RJR) that the EPA is bound to conclude that second-hand smoke is a Class A carcinogen, and that the company should begin to prepare for this eventuality.

ur efforts, therefore, should be directed at the next step in the regulatory process, which will be action of some type or another by OSHA. This is not to say that we should stop attacking the risk assessment, but we must be practical and start talking about what would be acceptable to RJR in terms of workplace regulations (assuming that OSHA will not push for a complete ban).
He also reports on the value of the H&K 'media tour efforts to date' [meetings with editors, columnists and journalists]. However, in future they would need to tone down their attack on the EPA.

    They are promoting their media tour by air-quality sampling at restaurants, offices, etc. and then putting out local press releases. They now wish to widen their contacts to include support groups (smoker's rights organisations), civic organisations, and minority media (they played the race card, suggesting that blacks or hispanics were being unfairly treated by anti-smoking legislation).

    He also wants to woo the unions:
We have an opportunity to cultivate a potentially powerful ally in organized labor:
  • the Court of Appeals blocked HHS from implementing a proposed no-smoking policy throughout the agency

  • An alliance with organised labor defeated a proposed Boston smoking ban.
Swetonic had an old friend, now a lobbyist, who had worked for 20 years in the AFL/CIO who may be useful.

1991 Jan 25: Matt Swetonic is commenting on the ETS Strategy being circulated by Tom Griscom [RJR VP Corporate Affairs]

  • The creation of a new astroturf: "American Institute for a Safer Indoor Environment" (AISIE) — MS agrees
  • Using the Center for Indoor Air Research (CIAR) — MS disagrees "because of its ties to the cigarette industry"
  • Creating a new quarterly scientific journal on indoor air — MS agrees.
  • Creating a speakers bureau — this is already in the pipeline
    • expand the speakers bureau
    • they need more than one boilerplate speech
  • Promote selected elements of RJR Tobacco's R&D program — MS agrees.
  • Send the SOT [Society of Toxicology] risk communications panel out as a road show. It could be promoted as a major media attraction — MS thinks this has high priority.
    [The tobacco industry had influence both in the Society of Toxicology and the Toxicology Forum (ILSI subsidiary) because of its generous funding]
  • Advertising by 'the coalition' [probably the TIEQ] — MS agrees cautiously.
  • Manufactured specialized articles for selected publications — MS agrees.
  • Using press-releases... and op-eds "that can be 'personalized' by 'friends'" - MS agrees.
  • Mount a symposium critical of the EPA's use of meta-analysis, and involve PBS or C-Span. — MS is doubtful
    • However, mounting a symposium on indoor air quality or risk assessment might attract TV attention.

Griscom replies to Swetonic expanding a number of points in his strategy. He wants to enlist the larger trade groups like Business RoundTable, National Association of Manufactures, NFIB (independent businesses), Chamber of Commerce, etc.

1991 Feb: /E Matt Swetonic has nominally transfered from the H&K offices back to E Bruce Harrison (Pinnacle Group) EBH had been the PR company behind the attack on Rachel Carson's "Silent Spring" back in the 1970s, and it had since worked extensively for the chemical manufacturers association.

    This transfer is probably more a change in the letterhead he used rather than representing any real change in location, etc. EBH seems to have been handed around between various major PR companies to provide a new front when needed.

1991 May 29: He sends Betsy Annese at RJR PR a "Revised Response to Reader's Digest." This is on E Bruce Harrison letterhead.

The 16 page Response:

1991 July 12: The chemical company Du Pont has abandoned its solidarity stance with the tobacco industry and begun to introduce smoking bans in the workplace. RJ Reynolds CEO Jim Johnson is advised by his issues management staff that

Du Pont appears to have worked to establish a reputation for itself as a leader in employee wellness issues. They have been cited in news stories on the subject and have discussed means of controlling health care costs, which was the focal point of their news release.

    It is also pointed out that RJR could being some economic pressure to bear on the company
Buying Power: RJRT spent about $3.4 million with Du Pont in 1990, and spent about $1.2 million through May of 1991. [RJR subsidiaries] PLS spends nothing with them, and RJRTI and NBI are still checking their figures for us.

    They also might attack the company via tobacco farmers who use Du Pont pesticides, and by Du Pont workers registered as smokers' rights participants. They are also planning to use personal contacts:
Contacts: Matt Swetonic, our account executive at E. Bruce Harrison Co., has a long-standing professional relationship with Don Verrico, DuPont's Manager of Environmental Affairs. He is also the boss of the woman who issued DuPont's news release. Matt is contacting Verrico on a casual basis to find out more about the reasons for the action.

    There are some interesting points that can be made by smokers groups, growers, etc. Yesterday's coverage in USA Today leaves Du Pont wide open for criticism (see attached article). Further, the Bronfman family, which controls Seagrams, owns a significant percentage of Du Pont stock. Du Pont also owns Remington Arms Company, a gun manufacturer, which could make this an item of interest for the NRA and other groups.

Swetonic gets an explanation from Du Pont

1991 Aug 15: Matt Swetonic and Jim Plante, both from E Bruce Harrison, have viewed a videotape created by the PR division of RJ Reynolds Tobacco.
[Plante was a consultant who had been Secretary of the Society of Professional Journalists, and on the staff of NBC News]

    The tape was intended to be circulated to the CEO of corporations facing workshop bans on smoking.

1991 Aug 23: The E Bruce Harrison Co has prepared a document "Communicating With Business About Smoking Policies" for RJ Reynolds Tobacco.
    • Phase 1 — The DuPont Scenario
      Survey of the Fortune 500 Companies
      Focus Groups
    • Phase II — Model Program (briefing book etc.)
    • Phase III — Delivering the message (Selling the Accommodation Model)
      Step 1: Present to the company
      Step 2: Meet the CEO program
      Step 3 : Presentation to Business Groups (BRT, NAM, Chambers of Commerce, etc)
      Step 4: Seminar series with the American Management Association
            This was to be a series of half-day seminars for RJ Reynolds in selected cities, with the assistance of the American Management Association. The seminars would be led by attorney Robert Nobile. Matt Swetonic has already approached the AMA.
[Both the RJR and the AMA documents are together in this file.]

    Step 5: National Environmental Development Association/TIEQ coaltion
    Step 6: Entertainment Organisations Coalition
    Step 7: Presentation to Science Organisations

AMA Submission:
    The attached submission to the AMA says:

E. Bruce Harrison & Co. is a consulting firm specializing in environmental issues. Mr. Swetonic is a Senior Vice President and the Director of Environmental Operations for E. Bruce Harrison & Co.

    One of the largest tobacco companies is a client of E. Bruce Harrison & Co. This tobacco company is interested in sponsoring a series of half day "public" seminars in strategic cities across the country on "The Development of Smoking Policies in Corporations." Both the tobacco company and E. Bruce Harrison & Co. believe that American Management Association is the organization best suited to developing and delivering such seminars.

    One of AMA's most popular course leaders is Bob Nobile. Mr. Nobile is an attorney who specializes in the development of Human Resource Policies and Procedures. He has written a book in which he has a chapter on Smoking and Non-Smoking Policies. A copy of his biography is attached to this proposal.

    Without having spoken to E. Bruce Harrison & Co.'s client, Mr. Nobile tentatively makes the following suggestions as to what might be covered in a program on the Development of Smoking Procedures in the corporate world.

    Budget details are included.

1991 Dec 13: Swetonoc is defending the "Joe Camel' appeal to children and the calculations of the financial cost of children smoking. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fhf33d00/pdf

1992: With E Bruce Harrison Co, NY in advising RJR on George Carlo

1992 May: In May 1992 Swetonic compiled a eight-page memo history reviewing the frustrations Hill & Knowlton had experienced in trying to promote the Premier cigarette since it took over the account from Burson-Marsteller in August 1987.

1992 May 6: RJ Reynolds had decided to try once again with the Premier cigarette. David Kalson, Matt Swetonic and Ward Hubbell were being briefed by Tom Griscom and Betsy Annese of RJR. Reynolds was building a plant overseas to make a modified version.

    The agreed problem with the first launch of Premier was "that smokers generally didn't like it" and the TV news programs mocked it. It was also expensive.

    They now needed to generate a "grassroots demand for advanced technologies in cigarettes.," and so science writers were a key target.

He [Griscom] contemplates scientific conferences in Europe and Japan in addition to important single hits like a Readers Digest [endorsement].

    On the political side, RJR will be hiring an unnamed political consultancy firm.
The AMA had petitioned to have the first release classified by the FDA as a drug.

    [This relaunch was given the Codename "Project SOP"
    See follow-up document from Swetonic, defining and distributing tasks.

1992 May 7: Swetonic send to Griscom his original memos on Premier — a 'summary of the PR woes surrounding the introduction of Premier, and our assessment of the situation just prior to it s being pulled from the market by KKR (the junk-bond/LBO company).

    Doug Hearle has just rejoined H&K, and he worked on the original launch.

The original draft memo:

1992 July 27: Swetonic and his associate Karlson at EBH have been asked to clean up an article/op-ed written for them by Prof Alvan Feinstein of Yale University (a long-term tobacco lackey)

The heavily edited article by Feinstein. Ironicly, it is an attack on the paid distortion of science!

1992 Aug 21: RJ Reynolds is meeting with Dr George Carlo, who was employed the following year by the Cellular Telephone Industry Association (CTIA) as head of Wireless Technology Research, and given $27 million of research funding to prove that cellphones were safe.

1992 Dec 13: Jim Plante, the Swetonic associate at EBH has advised Tom Griscom at RJ Reynolds that the next session of Congress will probably see...

"a full court press on an effect to ban tobacco advertising completely.

    Though we have just started sketching out ideas, we believe it is possible to build a credible coalition to approach the issue on a constitutional level by addressing the threat to commercial free speech.

    As we are currently striving to do on the ETS issue through NEDA/TIEQ, we would use a coalition to broaden the tobacco acivartising issue to include and involve all parties with a financial or philosophical-interest in commercial free speech.

    Optimally we see a coalition existing of five levels of interested parties. Three of ths five would have vested, financial interests in preventing a ban on advertising. Two would have philosophical or constitutional interests.

    The coalition would consiat of:
  • poisoning and polluting manfacturers
  • ad agencies
  • newspaper publishers and other media
  • "noted individuals of high public reputation"

    He thought he could build such a coalition without necessarily enlisting the American Newspaper Publishers Association

    This has been copied to Swetonic

1993 Jul 9: The Total Indoor Environment Quality association (TIEQ) Action plan sent to Betsy Annese and Rob Meyne (both PR) at RJ Reynolds Tobacco. This is a front coalition for the tobacco and chemical industries, which is being promoted as a subsidiary of the National Environmental Development Association (itself an industry front) by Hill & Knowlton via the E Bruce Harrison Co.

    The memo is from Matt Swetonic (signed 'TIEQ staff' — but actually in charge of the operation, and still with EBH). It has been sent via Steve Caldeira, the TIEQ's Executive Director.
    [Caldeira ran his own PR outfit, SJC & Associates in Darlen CT. Shortly after this memo he began working for Consolidated Safety Services [which does fake indoor air quality monitoring] and he also became the director of the Clean Air Devices Manufacturers organisation, tying these organisations and companies all together into a behind-the-scenes lobby coalition.

    TIEQ Staff
  • Executive Director — Steve Caldeira
  • Technical Director — Tim O'Leary [Chemical Mfg Assn]
  • Communications Director — Bill Grove [RJR Government Relations]
  • NOTE: Sally Robertson of EBH's NYC office will assist with publicity, and the promotion of TIEQ's seminars, as well as Special Projects for the coalition.
It also lists RJ Reynolds as one of four companies in the Steering Committe, and a dozen other chemical companies as associate members of the coalition.

    They are shifting focus to Letters to the Editor and Op-Ed articles for newspapers. Each year they will have one Roadshow Seminar ($25,000), Quarterly news letters ($4,500 ea), and some Media Training. The total budget is $243,000 for 6 months.

1993 Dec: The TIEQ 4th Quarter meeting for 1993 had a presentation from Jolanda Janczewski who had left ENVIRON to establish Consolidated Safety Services, and begun operating as an air-quality testing company... and also a subsidiary of the Tobacco Institute in its propaganda push to convince the public that second-hand smoke wasn't a threat to health.

    The members of the TIEQ coalition are all those companies opposed to workplace smoking bans and IAQ problems regulated by the OSHA and the EPA.

[Note that there is no mention of Swetonic in this document. Jolanda Janczewski, however, became listed during OSHA IAQ hearings as the TIEQ Senior Technical Advisor.]

1995: Swetonic is working with the Manhattan Institute (Peter Huber) on tort reform. The Manhattan Institute specialised in circulating dubious and distorted product liability stories ("A woman got $3 million in damages for spilling hot coffee, while driving her car." etc,)

    He also appears to be working to promote Michel Fumento (who later was caught fabricating scientific material) This report from Peggy Carter at RJ Reynolds to her superiors says"

Michael Fumento: Mike authored the Investor's Business Daily piece on the EPA's EST risk assessment that we've been sending out for some time. He told me that piece generated more reaction than anything he's ever done. He's clearly keeping his distance from the industry to preserve his neutral position.

    Matt Swetonic advises on the QT that work is in progress to nationally syndicate Mike as a science columnist.
In 2005 Fumento was exposed as having received $60,000 from Monsanto, one of the biotech companies he later covered in his columns — and Scripps Howard dismissed him.

    RJR at this time was also working with Steve Milloy who ran the science lobby astroturf TASSC for the tobacco industry (and now runs the notorious "www.junkscience.com" web site). Milloy, Fumento and Gough work as a group for polluting industries, both on product liability and promoting the idea that regulators used "junk science".

    Steve Redhead was a Congressional Research Section (CRS) employee who put his name on a pro-tobacco research report which had been written for the tobacco industry (and lived to regret it).
[Note: Swetonic doesn't appear to be doing much for RJR after 1993. He appears to have switched to Philip Morris]

1996 Mar 14: Memo advising Tom Borelli on planting story on journalists "Tobacco Industry Funded Research In Medical Journals" This has been ccd to Jim Wieghart, Washington Bureau Chief, New York Daily News

With regard to identifying a reporter (or reporters) who we might be able to Interest In doing a major piece on medical journals that refuse to publish research funded by the tobacco industry, we believe the target of first choice would be Rick Weiss, who wrote a balanced article on this issue late last year for The Washington Post. This assumes that we have additional Information on this issue that might prompt him to do a second plece.
He lists other journalists who may be 'interested'
[So they were considering a secret commission]

Late 1996: At some time towards the end of this year Swetonic becomes a partner in the Dilenschneider Group

1997 Mar 7: Swetonic is in contact with Tom Borelli (chief disinformation manager PM USA). He is promoting a project that will utilise Peter Huber of the Manhattan Institute, who was a tobacco-funded promoter of the "sound-science/junk-science" concept. He doesn't seem to realise that PM already has direct links to the Institute and Huber.

    He is now with the Dilenschneider Group and they are trying to muscle into the tobacco lobbying business. He writes.

P.S. Bob Dilenschneider is willing to move forward on an hourly rate basis for a couple of months to see how it works, but he wants to get back to a retainer arrangement — which is the relationship we have with all our other clients — as soon as possible.

1999 Jan 28: Matt Swetonic is the contact for the Dilenschneider Group on a press release attacking the Hartford School Board.

2000 July 12: Matt Swetonic, is still working for the Dilenschneider Group. [ Fax: 212/922-0971 mswetonic@dgi-nyc.com, 212/922-0900]

He is doing PR for Endovasc Ltd, Inc.


CONTRIBUTORS:samf sjc2 hrh2

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