This site deals only with the corporate corruption of science, and makes no inference about the motives or activities of individuals involved.
There are many reasons why individuals become embroiled in corporate corruption activities - from political zealotry to over-enthusiastic activism; from gullibility to greed.
Please read the OVERVIEW carefully, and make up your own mind.
Katherine L Becker
— A key director of State lobbying and disinformation activities for the Tobacco Institute —
Some key documents
• Tobacco Institute, State Activites - She left in mid 1987
1983 May 9: Katherine Becker's internal memo to Dan Milway (finance) at the Tobacco Institute about the use of Dr Lewis Solmon ... to clarify how he will work with Trish Milita at Ogilvy & Mather Public Relations. This follows a "Smoking in the Workplace" Task force conference.
Al Vogel of Response Analysis is also preparing a questionnaire. Solomon has been bought in to counter the "Weis-specific questions" [Seattle University's Professor William Weis had calculated that the additional cost-burden of smokers in a company was $4,789 per year]
Those to be "kept fully apprised of relevant developments and decisions [on workplace smoking issues]: Hurst Marshall, Alex King, Trish Milita (O&M), Bill Kloepfer/Bill Toohey and myself."
1986 July 13: File note by Katherine L Becker of the Tobacco Institute following an interview with Bill Trisler (BT - a Regional VP for Chicago area) re the value of "economic impact studies":
In BT's view, if Tobacco Institute sponsorship is identified, "red flags go up." Reaction is good if Institute sponsorship is not identified or if our representative has a "good relationship" with a legislator.
Note: This document includes a copy of the TI's questionairre.
BT believes the strong point of the study to be its data: Legislators are looking to the lobbyists for information. He recommends leaving out the weak section on the bill's effects on individuals. Bill would like to see a media support program which would extract and publicize key parts of these studies.
Bill rates Gray Robertson, Drs. Balter, Witorsch and [David] Weeks as "usually effective." Dr. Reasor is viewed as being less effective because of his inability to "close the sale" in a committee hearing. Also, whereas Drs. Balter and Witorsch can readily handle the frequently encountered problem of last-minute cuts in a witness's allotted time, such a situation "freaks out" Dr. Reasor.
Gray Robertson is considered a "very useful" witness because, in addition to being a polished witness, his testimony "dilutes" the criticism showered on the scientific people. Bill feels we need more Gray Robertson-type witnesses, preferrably local experts. (The ACVA-conducted study had been set for Chicago, however, urgent legislation elsewhere precluded it. Bill would like to use such a study this year, if possible.)
Bill perceives expansion of Gray Robertson/ACVA work (e.g., ventilation studies; testimony) through local experts as meeting Region Ill's "greatest need." Bill would like to have, for example, engineers from the University of Illinois able to testify on air pollution and ventilation at state and municipal hearings in that state.
The following resources were described by Bill as "most essential" 1) Scientific witness program, particularly Gray Robertson and one-on-one legislator-witness briefings; 2) Tax factsheets; 3) Economic witnesses; 4) Economic impact studies; 5) Media support.
1987 Apr 15: Chip Foley (at TI) on Ventilation Project to promote Gray Robertson and Sick Building Syndrome. Others involved were Peter Sparber, Susan Stuntz, Bill Cannell, Walter Woodson, Scott Stapf, Katherine Becker (State Activities), Rich Marcus (Ogilvy & Mather), Dennis Dyer, Ron Morris, John Kelly, Mike Brozek, Ric Scanlan and Jim Savarese
1987 June: /E She left the Tobacco Institute.