WARNING: This site deals only with the corporate corruption of science, and makes no inference about the motives or activities of individuals involved.
    There are many reasons why individuals become embroiled in corporate corruption activities - from political zealotry to over-enthusiastic activism; from gullibility to greed.
    Please read the OVERVIEW carefully, and make up your own mind.

OPINION ONLY

Some key documents

• Economist, North Carolina State University

1984 Jul: The Tobacco Institute's Cigarette Excise Tax Plan.

The plan augments our basic lobbying efforts by relying on groups outside the industry — some not regularly associated with the industry — to argue against excise taxes for us.

    It is an ambitious program, based on the notion that many of the most effective protests against tobacco taxes will come from groups philosophically distant from The Institute. Many such groups agree with us on the excise issue, even though they disagree with us on other matters.

    At the federal level, supporting Congressional members from the tobacco states is essential to our lobbyists. The tobacco members consistently vote as a unified group — something that is rarely seen in Congress today. They are our lobbyists' most important resource.

    The program recommends that economic and other consultants assist us in developing, "packaging," and presenting our anti-excise arguments in legislative testimony or meetings with coalition members.

Resources:
Economic consultants with different areas of expertise will conduct research and act as spokespersons for The Institute and organizations supported by The Institute. Specific activities with economists are discussed throughout the tactics.

Tactics:

• Stimulate reputable public finance economists at key state universities to determine the validity of state revenue forecasts, perhaps on behalf of state business organizations and present arguments against excise taxes in various forums; e.g., meetings with potential coalition members or budget officials.
• Encourage economists to make the case against regressive taxation in meetings with potential coalition members and legislators.
• Retain public finance economists affiliated with non-profit organizations to research the subject and use their findings in forums such as:
  • Private meetings with state legislators or staff ;
  • formal testimony before government bodies ;
  • targeted media appearances;
  • speeches before business, civic, labor, and other groups ;
  • tax symposia in key states where the proceedings could be published for use in other states ; and
  • articles which raise the visibility of key arguments in the business, academic, and popular press.

Strategies:

• Presenting specific members of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees with arguments prepared by economists with whom they share some common interest; e.g college affiliation, service on the same commission.
• Gaining the support of Citizens for Tax Justice (CTJ), the most influential labor/liberal tax reform group in the country, in opposition to excise taxes.
• Relying on the AFL-CIO — via The Bakery, Confectionery, and Tobacco Workers Union — to ensure that the labor/liberal tax package that emerges in the next session of Congress does not include tobacco.

Appendix: A list of economists in key states who may be willing to act as industry and third-party spokespersons on the tax issue.
Following is a list of economists in key states who might assist us as experts receiving honoraria. We have begun contacting them to ensure their willingness and expertise. We are asking each about past experience; work with similar issues; previous work with the industry; published articles or research; and availability.

    Our intent is to have a group of individuals whom we can call upon as needed to testify, conduct special research and discuss their research projects and/or views on excise taxes with budget officials, potential coalition members, legislators and the media.

1986 Jan: The Tobacco Institute's Public Relations Resource booklet for their Regional Directors, lists documents, booklets, article, posters and people who can help them fight local public smoking ordinances and threats to raise the excise taxes on cigarettes.

    It provides a long list of economists who are willing to speak at hearings, or write letters to the editor, or op-eds for the newspapers to counter the public smoking or excise tax threat.

    It lists him as:

• Professor Randy Rucker, Department of Economics, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC

Public Smoking/Witness: Local economists are available on two-weeks notice to provide economic testimony on the public smoking issue. Those economists who have testified or prepared op-ed pieces on the economic effects of public smoking are marked accordingly. The others may be briefed on the potential cost to government of implementing smoking restrictions.

Taxes/Witness:[He will] "explain why excise taxes are regressive and unfair to consumers and unsuitable and unreliable as a means to increase the federal revenue."

    Those economists who have testified or prepared op-ed pieces on the economic effects of public smoking are marked accordingly. The others may be briefed on the potential cost to government of implementing smoking restrictions.

1986 June 11: Peter Sparber at the Tobacco Institute memoes Fred Panzer, his boss enclosing a number of Congressional statements.[Only a few days after they were given]

Enclosed are statements prepared for various Congressional hearings on the tax issue that specifically comment on earmarking to some degree.

    These statements are by:

• Henry Butler of Texas A&M,
• William Shughart and Dwight Lee of George Mason submitted to Ways & Means, June 20, 1985;
• Bob Tollison of George Mason for the Chafee subcommittee on September 10, 1985;
• Randy Rucker of North Carolina State on the Rose bill on July 18, 1985; and
• CM Lindsay of Clemson for hearings on the Stark bill which never were held.

I've asked Jim Savarese, who provided these papers, to begin working on copy that could serve as the text for multipurpose anti-earmarking publications.

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