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WARNING: This site deals only with the corporate corruption of science, and makes no inference about the motives or activities of individuals involved.
    There are many reasons why individuals become embroiled in corporate corruption activities - from political zealotry to over-enthusiastic activism; from gullibility to greed.
    Please read the OVERVIEW carefully, and make up your own mind.


Smoking-Gun docs.


Cash-for-comment economists' network
General TI networks
James E Long
George Berman
James Savarese
Ctr.Study Pub.Choice
James Buchanan
Robert Tollison
Anna Tollison
Richard Wagner
James C Miller III
Carol M Robert
Elizabeth A Masaitis
Committee on Tax & Economic Growth
Harold Hochman
Fred McChesney
Thomas Borcherding
Delores T Martin
Dennis Dyer
George Minshew
Fred Panzer
Susan Stuntz
Peter Sparber
Carol Hrycaj
Debra Schoonmaker
Jeff Ross
Cal George
William Prendergast
Bill Orzechowski

Dominick Armentano
Burton A Abrams
Lee Alston
Ryan C Amacher
Gary Anderson
Lee Anderson
William Anderson
Terry Anderson
Scott E Atkinson
Roger Arnold
Richard W Ault
Michael Babcock
Joe A Bell
Bruce L Benson
Jean J Boddewyn
Peter Boettke
Thomas Borcherding
William J Boyes
Charles Breeden
Lawrence Brunner
Henry N Butler
Bill Bryan
Cecil Bohanon
John H Bowman
Dennis L Chinn
Morris Coates
Roger Congleton
Jeffrey R Clark
Michael Crew
Allan Dalton
John David
Michael Davis
Arthur T Denzau
Clifford Dobitz
John Dobra
Robert Ebel
Randall Eberts
Robert B Ekelund
Roger L Faith
David Fand
Susan Feigenbaum
Clifford Fry
Lowell Gallaway
Celeste Gaspari
David ER Gay
Kenneth V Greene
Kevin B Grier
Brian Goff
James D Gwartney
Sherman Hanna
Anne Harper-Fender
Kathy Hayes
Dennis Hein
James Heins
Robert Higgs
Richard Higgins
F Steb Hipple
Harold M Hochman
George E Hoffer
John Howe
Randall G Holcombe
William Hunter
Stephen Huxley
John D Jackson
Joseph M Jadlow
Cecil Johnson
Samson Kimenyi
David Klingaman
Roger Kormendi
Michael Kurth
David Laband
Suuner Lacroix
Dwight R Lee
Dennis Logue
James E Long
C. Matt Lindsay
Donald P Lyden
Craig MacPhee
Mike Maloney
Delores Martin
Chuck Mason
Charles Maurice
Fred McChesney
James E McClure
William McEachern
Richard McKenzie
Robert McMahon
Arthur Mead
Paul L Menchik
John F Militello
William C Mitchell
Greg Neihaus
James A Papke
Allen Parkman
Mark Pauly
William Peterson
Harlan Platt
Michael D Pratt
Thomas Pogue
Barry W Poulson
Edward Price
Robert Pulsinelli
Raymond Raab
Roger Riefler
Terry Ridgeway
Mario Rizzo
Morgan Reynolds
Simon Rottenberg
Randy Rucker
Richard Saba
Todd Sandler
David Saurman
Mark Schmitz
Robert Sexton
Gordon O Shuford
William Shughart
Robert J Staaf
Thomas Stimson
Wendell Sweetser
Mark Thornton
Mark Toma
David G Tuerck
Richard Vedder
Bruce Vermeullen
Richard Wagner
J Keith Watson
Burton Weisbrod
Walter E Williams
Paul W Wilson
Thomas L Wyrick
Bruce Yandle
Boon Yoon
Richard O Zerbe




Mwangi Samson ('Samson') Kimenyi    

(Also listed as Samson M Kimeny and Sampson)

— A graduate economist at the University of Mississippi who was paid to write op-ed pieces for local newspapers by the tobacco industry. —  

Professor Samson Kimenyi was a minor cog in an extensive wheel of conspiracy organised by lobbyist James Savarese and Professor Robert Tollison of George Mason University (GMU) on behalf of the tobacco industry.

This surrepticious network of compliant economists operated by using the facilities and staff of George Mason University's (GMU's) Center for the Study of Policy Choice [supposedly an independent study center within the university]. It extensively utilized the Center's membership list of extreme-libertarian professors of economics — most of whom were members of the 'Austro-Libertarian/Randian' tradition and members of the Public Choice Society; and who generally had tenured positions at various State universities.

These ultra-free-market professors were contracted on a pay-for-service basis to write pro-tobacco op-eds for their local newspapers, or react to requests circulated by the tobacco industry for help in defeating either excise tax measures or anti-smoking ordinances.

They were especially required to expoit the public trust inherent in their academic status — almost always a Professor at their local university — and not to reveal that the tobacco industry paid them for services rendered. In fact, many were encouraged to say they were 'non-smokers' — and use this claim to enhanse their credibility.

They were paid ($300 to $1000 per time ... later more) to:

  • Write op-ed articles for their main local newspapers. [chosen by the tobacco industry]
  • Write to their local Senators and Representatives. [designated by the tobacco industry]
  • Appear at local ordinance hearings and object to potential passive smoking bans.
  • Appear before local State Assemblies or at Congressional hearings.
  • Lecture at economic meetings or conferences on issues effecting the tobacco industry
  • Occasionally appear on broadcast or print media.
The propaganda they generated rarely had cigarettes or tobacco at its center — the messages were more obtuse and often cloaked in academic obfuscation. However it always had had focus on a number of issues important to promoting cigarettes:

  • Excise taxes were harmful to all American workers and businesses.
  • Excise taxes especially impacted the low-paid because of its 'regressive nature'. [They paid proportionally more disposable income to satisfy their nicotine addiction.]
  • Smoking bans of any kind were an infringement on Constitutional liberties — and once the government banned smoking, they would move to ban other personal pleasures.
  • Like any business, the tobacco industry had the Constitutional right to advertise its lethal products.
  • Personal freedom of choice was paramount. Smokers — including those addicted — were free to choose whether to smoke or not to smoke cigarettes.
Each network project, involved an op-ed article or report written to order by the Professor, then sent via James Savarese to the Tobacco Institute for their lawyers and PR people for legal checks, corrections and "improvements". The doctored article was then returned to the Professor for transmission to the designated newspaper. Clippings, and copies of letters to Congressmen, were then returned to the Tobacco Institute as "proof of service rendered."

While the members of this network were ideologically aligned to ultra-free-market economics, they were also knowingly part of a conspiracy to promote corporate-funded propaganda without acknowlegement of the funding source. This was a conspiratorial deception perpetrated by a trusted academic on the citizens who ultimately paid his or her salary.

The particpants were involved for no other reason than personal greed. And they were recruited despite knowing that the ultimate consequence of their actions was to promote an industry which resulted in the premature deaths and debilitation of millions of people around the world.

It is difficult to know how effective this operation was, but the Tobacco Institute supported this group of 50 to 100 Professors of Economics for a couple of decades, so they obviously felt they were getting value for money. Over the years new members joined and others left the group — but generally Savarese and Tollison recruited one or two economists for each State.

The Professors themselves, of course, justified and rationalised taking money from the tobacco institute on 'ideological grounds' — and never questioned the fact that they were exploiting and undermining the reputation of academics in general, or that the independent status of their own university was compromised by them acting as secret lobbyists for the tobacco industry.

Kimenyi is also a Research Associate with the Center for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, U.K. He has been a visiting Professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and a visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. Mwangi Kimenyi also served as member of the Board of Directors of Equity Bank, Kenya.
    Kimenyi received his undergraduate degree at the University of Nairobi-Kenya, and completed graduate studies at Ohio University and George Mason University, where he obtained a Doctorate degree in Economics in 1986. He has also studied for certificate programs at the University of Michigan and Harvard University.
    Kimenyi's research focuses on institutions and economic development, Africa's political economy, and policies for economic growth and poverty reduction. He has authored or co-edited 7 books, 6 policy monographs and has published widely in refereed journals and books.
    Kimenyi is a recipient of many honors and awards including co-winner of the Outstanding Research Award (2001) by Global Development Network (GDN), the Georgescu-Roegen Prize in Economics (1991), and was recognized by the Senate and House of the State of Mississippi for work on Public Transit. In 1994, Kimenyi was named by the Policy Review (Washington DC) among the top ten young market economists in the United States. During his tenure as Executive Director of the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA), the Institute was ranked the top policy institution in Africa and recognized as an international center of excellence.

Some key documents

• University of Missisippi, Graduate Economist - Later Assistant Professor

• The tobacco archives have 144 documents with Kimenyi's rather distinctive name — but about half of these are citations by other network economists in their ''you-cite-my-study-and-I'll-cite-yours" round robbin of mutual backscratching.

• Graduated from the University of Nairobi

1984 Jan: Although the documentation is scarce, it is quite clear from that available that the Cash-for-Comments Economists Network had begun to operate by this time.

Kenneth Greene and Harold Hochman had originally joined forces with James Savarese to help the Tobacco Institute lobby in New York State. Then Robert Tollison and Richard Wagner, who had been working for the international ICOSI organisation, had then transfered over Tobacco Institute control to expand the network to other US States.

1985–86: The Center for Policy Studies at Clemson University appeared to be publishing studies by the cash-for-comments economists, McKenzie, Shughart, Tollison, Kimenyi, Yandle, Matt Lindsay, Maloney, McChesney, Staaf. Laband — and others not apparently in the network.
[Both Tollison and Matt Lindsay were at Clemson University in 1985.]

1985–86: At this time the Center for Policy Studies [Clemson University] appeares to have been publishing studies by the cash-for-comments economists, McKenzie, Shughard, Tooilson, Kimeny, Yandle, Matt Lindsay, Maloney, McChesney, Staaaf. Laband — and others who were not apparently in the network.

1985: See Center for the Study of Public Choice 43 page self-congratulatory booklet.

Three Center projects deal with the positive economics of antitrust law enforcement.

    Professor William Shughart and Center graduate student M.S. Kimenyi are developing a series of econometric tests to distinguish empirically between competing hypotheses concerning the pro- and anti-competitive aspects of nonstandard contract terms — uniform delivered pricing, advance price notification, and most favored customer clauses —that were used until the late 1970's by domestic producers of antiknock gasoline additives.

    Professors Shughart and Robert Tollison (with Dr Richard Higgins of the FTC) also produced a study which examined the impact of state public utility commissions on the probability that mergers between gas and electric utilities would be approved. Finally, Professors Shughart and Tollison wrote a paper presenting evidence that antitrust enforcement has increased significantly the average annual U.S. civilian labor force unemployment rate during this century.

Kimenyi appears to have joined the network at this early stage while he was still a graduate student.

1985 Dec: The Annual Report of the Center for the Study of Public Choice at the George Mason University.

The Center for Study of Public Choice is an integral part of George Mason University. While maintaining its separate identity, the Center staff is part of the George Mason Economics Department. As such, the university budget covers the salaries of the permanent Center staff and minimal operating expenditures. Excluding the physical facility which houses the Center, St. George's Hall, general university support in 1984 additionally amounted to some $'0,000 on an annual basis.

    Center activities extend beyond those supported by the university. Funds for summer and release-time research, guest lecturers, visiting scholars, graduate students, and for supplemental travel and operating expenses have been provided by external supporters. External support in 1985 summed to approximately $300,000. These funds were provided by numerous external supporters, to whom we are very grateful for their sustained support over the years.

    [One of those generous supporters was the tobacco industry — and, in return, they were provided with the administrative and organizational services of the Center — both to create cash-for-comments lists of academics, and to act as a front for seminars, conferences, and the production of published material.

    The nominal director of the Center was James Buchanan, but Robert Tollison actually ran the operation — certainly that part which became an arm of the tobacco industry.
  • Elizabeth A Masaitis and Carol M Robert were employed as secretaries at the Center
  • Dwight Lee and William Shughart were both Research Associates.
They all worked with Anna Tollison and James Savarese & Associates in organising and running the economists network for the Tobacco Institute.

    Other economists associated with the Center as graduate students or research associates also became recruited into this cash-for-comments network [and most are well-known in other far-right-wing influence organisations].
  • Gary Anderson, University of Rhode Island
  • Wayne Brough, University of Central Florida
  • Samson Kimenyi, (University of Mississippi later)
  • Jack Wiseman, University of York, England

1986: This is the Tollison/Saverese network list for 1986. It has 64 names, but it still doesn't cover all ' States. Some States have two or three network members, so newspapers [and sometimes Congressmen] need to be specified for each member to ensure there is no accidental duplication.

    Telephone numbers (office and home) are often included in case an urgent op-ed or ordinance hearing is needed. These are grouped by State:

Prof Samson Kimenyi
    27 Faculty Housing, University, MS 38677, 601-234-3684 (h) 601-232-5492 (w)

1988 Mar 31: The Tobacco Institute's list of available economists, with details of their target for a review of Robert Tollison and Richard Wagner's "Smoking and the State" book (secretly funded and published by the tobacco industry). Jim Savarese writes to Jeff Ross who looks after the cash-for-comments network:

I have listed below potential areas where we could place book reviews for the Tollison/Wagner monograph.

    Targeted paper: Jackson Clarion Ledger
    Economist: Samson Kimenyi, University of Mississippi.

1988 May 26: Savarese advises the Tobacco Institute that

We have initiated the book review project. A copy of the book and a short summary were sent out today to 17 economists across the country with instructions for writing a brief review suitable for newspaper publication.

    I have attached a list of the economists. I'll keep you up to date as soon as the reviews start rolling in.
Kimenyi's name was on the list.

1988 June: /E Kimenyi's Draft Book Review "Smoking and the State: Social Costs, Rent Seeking and Public Policy" has been sent for checking to the Tobacco Institute.

    He is credited as "Assistant Professor of Economics, The University of Mississippi. He concludes in high praise of the book [After the TI writers have sub-edited his draft]:

This small book is a breath of fresh air into the social cost debate which until now has been plagued by self interest, tainted evidence, and lack of sound economic reasoning. The book is well-balanced and should be used in policy formulation not only in regard to smoking but also other activities, particularly those which are associated with social costs.
However he forgets to mention that Tollison and Wagner are both friend and close associates — or that the Tobacco Institute paid both for the book and for his article.

    The Tobacco Institute and their lawyers have made a few substantial changes.
The retyped version

    A Savarese list a few months later suggests that he has has already managed to sell his book review to the Jackson Clarion Ledger.

1988 July 13: Savarese writes to Debby Schoonmaker at the Tobacco Institute

I need your help on this one. I have had this for six weeks and forgot to send it to you for legal clearance. The economist, Professor Kimenyi, called me yesterday to see if he is suppose to proceed with publication of this book review.

    Can you please put a super rush on this for purposes of legal clearance so I can keep him happy?
[Articles were sent by the Tobacco Insitute to both Covington & Burling and to Shook Hardy & Bacon for legal clearance — and it often took the lawyers two to three weeks to get around to checking them.]

    The response came back to Debbie from Carol Hrycaj, saying
"Kimenyi's review is included among the "controversial" items. I'll request rush review for his piece"

1988 July 14: A number of the economists' pseudo-reviews of the Tollison/Wagner book Smoking and the State have been sent to the lawyers for legal clearance.

Once again, I am forwarding several reviews of Smoking and the State for your comment. You will find that we marked certain sections of these reviews that appear to be controversial. Would you suggest alternative language for those passages?

    Included in this package are critiques prepared by Brian L Goff, Cliff P Dobitz, Samson M Kimenyi and Allen M Parkman. In addition, enclosed is an executive summary of the Tollison and Wagner book. The copy reflects our comments.

    Due to a deadline for publication, Professor Kimenyi has requested we expedite the review of his article and obtain.clearance as soon as possible.

She also sends the same articles to Shook Hardy & Bacon with the same request. It is not clear why two of the largest and most experienced tobacco law firms would be both asked to vet such documents.

1988 July 27: Richard Wagner, writing on the letterhead of the Center for Study of Public Choice at George Mason University, writes to James Savarese [as surrogate for the Tobacco Institute]. The tobacco industry is fighting to block the 'ear-marking' of cigarette excise taxes for Federal health programs.

    He is outlining a book editing project being mounted by himself and Robert Tollison. All of the chapter writers involved [apart from a French economist Henri LePage] were cash-for-comment economists.
There are two quite distinct versions of the book proposal:

  • Charging Beneficiaries for Public Services: User Charges and Earmarked Taxes in Principle and Practice. Kimenyi was involved with Lee and Tollison in writing Chapter 10:
    "Earmarked Taxes, Lobbying, and Budgetary Choice"
    Earmarking injects very different incentives into the budgetary process, as compared with general fund financing. With general fund financing interest groups have strong incentive to compete for larger shares of the budget, but only weak incentive to lobby for tax increases. Earmarking creates a strong incentive for interest groups to lobby for tax increases, and this paper will explore the consequences and implications of this difference in incentive.

    This chapter ended up later described in these words:
  • Chapter 9"Tax Earmarking and the Optimal Lobbying Strategy," by Mwangi S. Kimenyi, the University of Mississippi; Dwight R. Lee, University of Georgia; and Robert D. Tollison, George Mason University.
    The authors investigate how lobbying by special interest groups differs when excise tax revenues are earmarked, as compared with going into a general fund. Using models and examples, the authors show that tax earmarking leads to lobbying in favor of increasing tax revenues.
The Tobacco Institute's Tax Hearing Readiness Plan in the following year had a note saying:
Several new excise tax-related studies are underway and will be completed by spring 1989. In addition, an update of the Chase economic impact study has been commissioned.

    Due by mid-year is a book examining earmarking and "user fees" from a public choice perspective. The treatise will contain 8-10 chapters written by respected economists, including, Henri LePage and Nobel laureate James Buchanan.

    Preliminary research has been conducted assessing public attitudes toward excise taxes.

    Specialist PR firm Fleishman-Hilliard were then contracted to promote this book and its authors around the various states in the USA.


Wagner and Tollison propose that the book contain 12 chapters individually authored by themselves and five other members of our economists network. While these economists are all credible and respected academicians, the treatise will almost certainly be enhanced by contributions from Henri LePage and Nobel laureate James Buchanan

    The budget proposed for this project was $145,000 — with eleven of the cash-for-comments chapters earning their (often multiple) authors about $5,000 per chapter. James Buchanan, the guru of Public Choice, was willing to lend his name to the whole enterprise for $20,000. Dick Wagner and Robert Tollison also wanted $25,000 each for management and administration. [Savarese appears to have been cut out of this deal]

1988 Oct: A Savarese memo notes that his review of the Tollison/Wagner "Smoking and the State" book was

Jackson Clarion Ledger

1988 Dec 1: James Savarese reports to Susan Stuntz at the Tobacco Institute on his unit's activites during November (for himself and his employee, Leslie Dawson). This provides a valuable overview of the range of activities his organisation engaged in for the tobacco industry during just the month of November.

    His consultancy is specialising in coopting labor and economists, and countering the next Surgeon General's report. He holds $135,855.26 of Tobacco Institute money in his company account; receives new deposits of $114,589.55 from the Tobacco Institute, and pays out $173,478.18.
    He gives details:

  • met with officials of the Economic Policy Institute (EPI) to discuss tax strategy.
  • continued discussion with Coalition of Labor Union Women (CLUW) re national convention
  • continued work with National Energy Management Institute (NEMI) on development of training program and brochure.
  • meetings with Citizens for Tax Justice, Leadership for the New Century, Citizens for Tax Justice, National Economic Commission.
  • on the task force for Airline Cabin Air Quality (weekly meetings/ writing op-eds)
He also lists successes he has had with getting economists to plant op-eds on various local newspapers.
  • Prof David Saurman - op-ed on Prop 99 with San Jose Mercury News
        Also numerous reviews of the Tollison/Wagner book "Smoking and the State".
  • Prof Ryan Amacher (Clemson Uni) in The State.
  • Joseph Jadlow (Oklahoma State Uni) in Tulsa Tribune.
  • Todd Sandler (Iowa State Uni) in Fort Dodge Messenger.
  • Robert B Ekelund (Auburn Uni) Montgomery Advertiser.
  • Dwight R Lee (Washington Uni) Regulation Magazine.
  • Samson Kimenyi (Uni of Mississippi) in Jackson Clarion ledger.
  • David ER Gay (Uni of Arkansas) in Arkansas Democrat.
Also attached are the accounts ($114,589 for the Tobacco Industry Labor Management Committee disbursement.

1989 Jan 4: Savarese sends his December Status Report to Susan Stuntz at the Tobacco Institute. It lists dozens of projects that he is supervising — and meetings he is organizing to help the tobacco industry create coalitions with other industries and unions.

    Entries most relevant to the cash-for-comments economists are:

  • participated in strategy sessions on the National Economic Commission (NEC). [Later a general economists op-ed project]
  • Agricultural Research project — began development of research proposals on the effect of excise taxes on farmers. [Later became an Ekelund and Long 'study'.]
  • Airline Cabin Air Quality — continued op-ed project on Northwest Airlines. [They had been first to ban smoking on domestic flights] As of January 3, three op-ed projects have been published
    • Shreveport Journal [by] Michael Kurth, McNeese State Uni
    • Commercial Appeal [by] JR Clark, University of Tennessee at Martin
    • The Greenville News [by] Ryan Amacher, Clemson University
  • Began Ad Ban op-ed project. As of January 3 one op-ed has been published
    • Chicaco Tribune [by] Lloyd Cohen, California Western School of Law.
  • Social Cost Book Review Program [smoking and the State] - As of January 3, seven book review have been published.
    • The State [by[ Ryan Amacher, Clemson University
    • Tulsa Tribune [by] Joseph Jadlow, Oklahoma State Uni
    • Grand Forks Herald [by] Cliff Dobitz North Dakota State University
    • Fort Dodge Messenger [by] Todd Sandler Iowa State University
    • Montgomery Advertiser [by] Robert B. Ekelund Auburn University
    • Bryan-College Station [by] Charles Maurice Texas A&M University
    • Columbus Enquirer by Dwight R. Lee Washington University
    Three are forthcoming:
    • Regulation Magazine [by] Dwight R. Lee Washington University
    • Jackson Clarion Ledger [by] Samson Kimenyi University, Mississippi
    • Arkansas Democrat [by] David E. R. Gay University of Arkansas

1989 Jan 11: The Tobacco Institute's Scientific Consultancy Activity 1988-89
This is an 80 page mixed bag of files dumped together [Well worth perusing]. The first document is from 1990 [ordered in reverse]

  • Pages 3 to 23 begin with Witness Appearances in 1988 and 1989 involving both "Indoor Air Quality experts" who work for the Tobacco Institute, and three economists [Bob Tollison, Richard Wagner and Dwight Lee]
  • Pages 24 to 31 Labor IAQ Presentations in 1988 and 1989 which involves key figures in the labor movement and a few "IAQ experts."
  • Pages 32 to 39 IAQ/ETS conferences attended by tobacco industry disinformation experts in 1988 and 1989
  • Pages 40 to 41 Academic and Unaffiliated Scientfic Witnesses
  • Pages 43 to 53 Smokers Rights Legislation in various states.
  • See page 54: Tobacco Institute "Confidential" memo on "Tax Hearing Readiness" which is their battle plan to counter earmaking of cigarette excise taxes to fund health programs. It lists a large number of organizations and a few congressmen who can be relied on to help. It also has both primary and secondary lists of economists from Tollison's "cash-for-comments" network willing to give testimony.
    Economists: [Primary]
    • Bill Orzechowski, Tobacco Institute
    • Robert Tollison, George Mason University
    • Richard Wagner, George Mason University
    • Dwight Lee, University of Georgia, Athens
    • Michael Davis, Southern Methodist University
    • Gary Anderson, California State at Northridge
    • William Prendergast (resource: Prendergast/Solmon papers)
    • Other Network economists [see Secondary attached list below]

          "Due by mid-year is a book examining earmarking and "user fees" from a public choice perspective. The treatise will contain 8-10 chapters written by respected economists, including, Henri LePage and Nobel laureate James Buchanan."
    The Tobacco Institute's list of cash-for-comments professors and senior academics who were available to write op-eds and give evidence at Congressional hearings, etc. had grown extensively.

    Prof Samson Kimenyi, Univerity of Mississipi [Faculty Housing]

[TI budget papers show that each op-ed now earned the economists $3,000. Presentations to conferences earned them $5,000. Savarese was paid $70 to $100,000 pa for this project, and Ogilvy & Mather $2',000.]


See page 5

1989 May 31: Debbie Schoonmaker recommends funding of Tollison & Wagner's "Earmarking Book Proposal"

1989 Oct: /E The Earmarking Book Proposal chapter to be written by Tollison and Kimenyi has now been changed to "Tax Earmarking and the Optimal Lobbying Strategy" and acquired Dwight Lee as a third contributor.

1989 Oct 3: Savarese is beginning to pass on chapters of the new book to the Tobacco Institute for general editing and legal clearance.

1990 Jan 23: Robert Tollison sends Martin Gleason the

"Preface and first five chapters of the book + the 'third of the four billings for this project" = $36,2'
(Total must have been $145,000) This bundle consists of the contributions from Richard E Wagner, Gary M Anderson, Bruce Yandle. Dwight R Lee, Henri LePage, Mwangi S Kimenyi and James M Buchanan.

    It also contains comments from Michael T Buckley at Covington & Burling

1990 May 7: The Tobacco Institute's "1991 Tax and Social Cost Plans" have sections on

  • "Social Costs" Hearings Readiness (preparation for fielding witnesses at Congressional hearings.) They list here the arguments
    What TI and Its Allies Must Cover
    1. "Social cost" arguments used to justify excise tax increases, smoking restrictions and ad bans are not valid.
    2. Independent economists state that "social cost" calculations used by anti-smokers do not withstand credible economic scrutiny.
    3. There is no convincing economic evidence that smokers impose costs on society. Any supposed costs are "private costs" and are borne by the smoker.
    4. Other industries are vulnerable to social cost attacks. A "slippery slope" may exist as anti-smokers, using "social costs" arguments, seek legislation restricting smoking or increasing taxes. These efforts may signal lawmakers to regulate other products as well.
  • "Tax" Hearing Readiness (as above, but for excise tax increases, State and Federal)
    What TI and Its Allies Must Cover
    1. Excise taxes are regressive and take away tax reform for low- and middle-income Americans. As a percentage of income, low income families pay as much as 27 times more in federal excises than high-income families.
    2. Cigarette excise taxes are discriminatory. They fall disproportionately on Blacks, Hispanics and other minorities.
    3. Excise taxes are unfair. Tobacco consumers are forced to pay more than others for government services benefitting everyone. Why should smokers pay more for national defense than nonsmokers?
  • List of cash-for-comment network economists in each State.
This is an updated list with the current locations of each, with phone numbers and addresses.
Prof Samson Kimenyi
27 Faculty Housing
University, MS 38677 [
] (h) 601-232-5492 (w)

1993 Mar 23: Jim Savarese is proposing to Cal George at the Tobacco Institute a new Op-ed program.

Outlined below is our proposed op-ed program in opposition to the use of excise taxes to finance health care.
  1. Op-ed article by Robert Tollison to be submitted to Wall Street Journal $ 4,000.00

  2. Rebuttal article by Bob Ekelund, Auburn University, to be submitted to the Birmingham News $ 3,000.00

  3. "Monster" tax op-ed project using twenty economists (list attached) to submit articles in opposition to using excise taxes on cigarettes to finance health care reform - to be submitted to twenty newspapers in twenty different states $60,000.00

    TOTAL $67,000.00
This economist is listed as one of the proposed lucky recipients of $3,000 in largess from the Tobacco Institute for slashing out a quick op-ed. He was to submit the article to Jackson Clarion-Ledger.

1993 May 2: Kimenyi is listed in Savarese's Status Report on the Monster Tax Op-Ed Project His target is the Mississippi newspaper, Jackson Clarion-Ledger.

    However a later list in the same file shows that Mississippi was now under the control of Professor Bill Shughart. He had been active and already sent a draft and received back a 'revised copy' which had then been returned for legal clearance.

1993 Aug 3: This is a series of lists dated from March to August 1993. Savarese's staff have sent these to the Tobacco Institute to progressively report successes and failures with the economists writing op-ed pieces and having them published.

    Collectively they give us a good idea as to how the network worked and how litte they managed to plant on the major newspapers (the smaller local papers were obviously easy.) It's also interesting to observe the mechanical processes and the tight control the tobacco industry and its lawyers exerted over these academic lackies.

  • The articles were either rejected, revised or passed by Jim Savarese and his staff
  • They were then sent for checking and alteration by Calvin George [Cal] at the Tobacco Institute.
  • The lawyer David Reemes who worked for the industry's main Washington lawfirm Covington & Burling then cleared them for publication.
  • The economist then received the revised copies back for onward transmission to the selected newspapers.
  • They would then send a copy to their local Congressmen without mentioning the tobacco industry's contractual arrangement.
Clearly, by 1993, many of the original network members were dropping out. The Tobacco Institute also appears to have been having problems getting even those academics who stayed loyal to write articles that justified their $2000 to $3000 payments. [Perhaps some of them developed a conscience!]

    Despite the protestations, these are not 'independent' opinion articles. They are industry-shaped, manipulated propaganda pieces designed as advocacy vehicles to promote tobacco interests in political, media and public circles — even when they don't directly mention or promote cigarettes or smoking.

    These lists are all headed 'MONSTER' Tax Op-Ed Project:
    Sampson Kimenyi [later transfered to] Professor Bill Shughart II, Department of Economics and Finance, University of Mississippi, MS
    • Mar 23 — [TI designated newspaper/s] Jackson Clarion-Ledger
    • Apr 9 — Recieved 4/15/93 — Sent to Cal 4/16/93 — Received from Cal 4/22/93 — Waiting - legal 4/28/93 — Returned 4/29/93 — Rev. Draft 4/30
    • May 12 — Submitted to the Jackson Clarion-Ledger
    • May 18 — (as above)
    • June 2 — Published by Jackson Clarion-Ledger
    • June 14— Published by Jackson Clarion-Ledger on 6/7/93
    • Aug 3 — (as above)

This appears to be the end of Kimenyi's involvement as a formal cash-for-comment economist in the State of Mississippi.

2007 Sept 19: Republic of Kenya. High Court of Kenya at Nairobi


Misc. 1769/04 — Professor Mwangi S. Kimenyi Vs. Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Planning

A Conservative viewpoint
Kenya is known as a breeding ground for long-distance runners, not free-market economists. But when Samson Kimenyi, a graduate of the University of Nairobi, came across the writings of public choice theorists, he had a transforming intellectual experience. Students of public choice theory apply economic analysis to the behavior of politicians and government officials, unlike many conventional economists, who have assumed that government officials act in the "public interest."

    Public choice economists assume that politicians are self-interested individuals who rationally pursue incentives, such as the campaign funding and special interest support that will ensure reelection. Bureaucrats who are not subject to market forces also come under fire from public choice enthusiasts, who accuse them of "rent-seeking." Rent-seekers try to guarantee monopoly rents, or profits, for themselves, by erecting government-enforced barriers to employment of outsiders. These barriers include unions, complex licensing requirements, quotas and ideological litmus tests—all of which immunize existing producers from competition.

    Kimenyi decided to pursue his doctorate at George Mason, where he studied under James Buchanan and Robert Tollison. As an African native with a public choice orientation, Kimenyi, now an associate professor at the University of Connecticut, has developed a unique perspective on issues of race relations, poverty, and development—his research interests. This perspective is far from politically correct.

    Kimenyi has had the temerity to criticize the ethnic and gender studies programs that have sprung up like weeds on campuses across America. The seeds of such specialty programs were sown during the late 1960s, and today hundreds are firmly established within the nation's universities. These programs have come under fire by traditionalists, but Kimenyi is among the few to subject them to rigorous economic analysis. Several years ago, he received a grant from the Sarah Scaife Foundation [Richard Mellon Scaife] to conduct such a study. Kimenyi published research results of his analysis of salaries paid at 20 American universities in Academic Questions.

    He concluded that rhetoric about helping "disadvantaged" groups serves as a smokescreen to obscure the true purpose of specialty programs — to allow rent-seeking faculty to feather their own nests. Kimenyi shows that faculty teaching in these departments tend to be underqualified and overpaid in comparison with their counterparts in traditional disciplines. Teaching in "academic ghettos" allows faculty members to insulate themselves from competition, while increasing the demand for their services. Kimenyi argues that the programs exist because of a coalition between rent-seeking faculty and administrators who fear campus activism. The appeasement of campus radicals is the only viable function that these programs serve, according to Kimenyi. "The quality of these programs or what happens to students who graduate from them appears to be of little concern to the university administrators or the faculty," he writes.

    Kimenyi's gripe with specialty programs carries over into his professional life. In a Lincoln Review article, Kimenyi describes encounters with black studies departments, whose administrators discriminated against him due to his unorthodox views. Kimenyi, who served as minority affairs administrator for the School of Business Administration while teaching at the University of Mississippi, also expresses dismay at the way many such administrators casually and callously enforce lower academic standards for minority students.

    Kimenyi's article, "Rational Choice, Culture of Poverty, and the Intergenerational Transmission of Welfare Dependency" was named the Southern Economic Journal's article of the year for 1991. This research has strong implications for the current debate over welfare reform. His analysis of African and East European dictatorships discusses the effect of economic rent-seeking by groups as diverse as tribes, military units, foreign aid recipients, civil servants, urbanites, and farmers.

2009: Professor of Economics, University of Connecticut.

2009 Aug 21: He a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution

Mwangi Samson Kimenyi, an associate professor of economics in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences [Uni of Conn.], has joined Brookings as a senior fellow.

    The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit, nonpartisan public policy organization based in Washington, D.C. Kimenyi will join the Africa Growth Initiative, part of Brookings' Global Economy and Development program.

    Kimenyi is also founding executive director of the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis, which advises the Kenyan government and the private sector.

2012 Jun: He is also the Principal - Mwangi S. Kimenyi & I.W. Kimenyi Research Associates LLC

2013: Mwangi S. Kimenyi is senior fellow and director of the Africa Growth Initiative [Brookings Institute]. The founding executive director of the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (1999-2005), he focuses on Africa's development including institutions for economic growth, political economy, and private sector development.



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