This site deals only with the corporate corruption of science, and makes no inference about the motives or activities of individuals involved.
There are many reasons why individuals become embroiled in corporate corruption activities - from political zealotry to over-enthusiastic activism; from gullibility to greed.
Please read the OVERVIEW carefully, and make up your own mind.
J Kendrick (III) Wells
He was listed as a "friend of tobacco", by Texas government in its 1996 action against tobacco.
He is listed in B&W documents as the Assistant General Counsel at Brown & Williamson in the '70s to '90s, and he was still a senior executive at B&W. in 1998
In the 1970s he was attending the global tobacco strategy sessions held by the SAWP group in Europe - along with "all the normal suspects" (tobacco scientists and executives) — Aviado, Seltzer, Haas, Sterling, Furst, Sirridge, Berger, Nystrom, Lee, Adlkofer, Whist, Panzer, Senkus, Vogel, Hargrove, Ely, Finnegan, Seymour, Kloepfer, Toet, Corner, Bruckner, & etc.
In January 17, 1995 he wrote the famous deadwood memorandumwhich dealt with "document retention" (subtext = "destruction") of "engineering and scientific reports." Wells advice as a lawyer was that any documents dealing with "biological studies" and mouse skin painting should be considered "deadwood", shipped overseas, and he stressed that no one should make any notes about the documents.
In February 1989 he was discussing with Ernst Pepples (Senior Vice President and Counsel at B&W) the legal implications of receiving a scientific report.
Wells was in the thick of all Smoking & Health activities of the tobacco industry
Some key documents
Listed as friend of tobacco, by Texas gov in 1996 in action against tobacco.
Assistant general counsel at B&W in the eighties, and still a senior executive at B&W. (-1998) .
The deadwood memorandum was written by Brown & Williamson General Counsel J. Kendrick Wells and dated January 17, 1995. It referencing "document retention" of "engineering and scientific reports," Wells wrote about how "biological studies" and mouse skin painting studies should be considered "deadwood", shipped overseas and stressed that no one should make any notes about the documents.
discussing with Pepples B&W in Feb 1986 the legal implications of receiving scientific report.
1979 May 20: - 24th SAWP/ICOSI strategy/science meeting in Zurich - with Aviado, Seltzer, Haas, Sterling, Furst, Sirridge, Berger, Nystrom, Lee, Adlkofer, + Whist, Panzer, Senkus, Vogel, Hargrove, Ely, Finnegan, Seymour, Kloepfer, Toet, Corner, Kenrick Wells, Bruckner etc.etc. See Agenda
1990 April 10: Kendrick Wells with B&W in the USA writes to Cannar at BAT in the UK on "Current Smoking and Health Legal Matters". He is worrying about documents surfacing:
The threat of discovery against B&W continues. B&W has active cases and Professor Daynard [Anti-smoking legal activist] is haunting the halls of plaintiff's lawyers encouraging them to issue discovery demands against B&W and BATCo. We should eipect to see plaintiffs in future trials present a stronger attack on the defendant's conduct and credibility than was seen in Koller.
He is worried about three categories of documents, and gives some scenarios in which certain documents open them to legal attack:
Government activities in the US also involve the possibility that B&W might be required to produce documents and witnesses. Legislative activity involving smoking and health issues has intensified in the Congress and the Federal Trade Commission is taking a newly aggressive position on tobacco industry issues.
The Government Accounting Office required B&W and RJR [Rynolds] to answer interrogatories which included smoking and health questions in the course of an investigation of export trade.
[As was proved by the existence of this document!]
A related concern is that a plaintiff might find communications to B&W which said, for example, "Here is Group research policy" or "Every company in the Group will adopt the following policy related to research." The plaintiff could argue the statements supported a conspiracy theory or argue communications showed the companies were operated as a unit.
- Group one documents.A group of documents which show a company had conducted substantial investigation and development of alternative components, construction, and designs of cigarettes.
The company tested the alternatives to obtain various biological assessments, such as burning them and conducting in vitro tests on the resulting "tar." The documents contain statements that one purpose of the program was to develop a cigarette which produced a tar" with reduced biological activity.
Test results indicate some experimental components and cigarettes had lower biological activity scores on the tests than traditional cigarettes.
[Illustrates they were searching for a 'safe' cigarette - which implies knowledge they were dangerous. Also attack on credibility of past statements.
- Group two documents.The documents in the first grouping plus others which show the company had developed ft product from the research (for example, a cigarette which produced less CO) and had stated to a government agency that the product addressed government concerns about cigarettes.
[Statement was misleading, or admission of causation, or showed a safer product could have been made.]
- Group three documents. [Any which showed the company] intended to develop a [safer] product. These could involve constituents believed to be harmful; basic research; addiction issues .. eg."Our product is nicotine in a package."; susceptible minority research; regulatory forecasts; marketing of low-tar, mild, extra-light cigarettes.
- Style of Meeting Reports. To ensure that only resolutions and actions are recorded, not discussion and opinion.
- B&W and BATCo Relationship: Alleged [that we] are involved in a conspiracy involving several product litigation issues and name BATCo a co-defendant in US. product ligitation. The central research facility concept, depending on how it is implemented, could provide argument for plaintiffs' conspiracy theory.
1991 Feb 12: These lawyers are being organised for an ETS Strategies meeting, and the ETS Coordinators from the companies are also invited.
These are lawyers on the ETS Strategies Group.
- Chuck Wall, VP and Associate General Counsel of PM Companies
- Thomas Bezanson, of Chadbourne & Parke - American Brands and Gallaher
- Nicholas B Cannar, BAT in London,UK
- Peter J van Every, RJ Reynolds, Winston-Salem
- Marion Funck, Reemtsma Cigaretten Fabriken GmbH
- Dr Christoph Walther, Reemtsma, Hamburg Germany
- Alan D Porter, Imperial, Bristol UK
- Paul A Randour, American Brands, Old Greenwich CT
- James W Seddon, Rothmans International Denham, Uxbridge, Middlesex UK
- J Kendrick Wells, III, Assistant General Counsel - Product Litigation, B&W
Also other "ETS Coordinators". from the IEMC
- Jerry Katz, American Brands - Gallaher
- Sharon Boyse, BAT
- David Swan, Imperial
- Tom Griscom, RJ Reynolds
- Richard Marcotullio, RJ Reynolds
- David Rowland, Rothmans
- Steve Parrish, Philip Morris
2000 March: AG&M listing of those responsible West Virginia Class Action
Special Assistant General Counsel for Product Litigation, Brown & Williamson.