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CREATED 5/21/2013

WARNING: This site deals only with the corporate corruption of science, and makes no inference about the motives or activities of individuals involved.
    There are many reasons why individuals become embroiled in corporate corruption activities - from political zealotry to over-enthusiastic activism; from gullibility to greed.
    Please read the OVERVIEW carefully, and make up your own mind.


Smoking-Gun docs.


AdeT ETS/EPA report
Cash-for-comment economists' network
General TI networks
James E Long
George Berman
James Savarese
Ctr.Study Pub.Choice
James Buchanan
Robert Tollison
Anna Tollison
Richard Wagner
James C Miller III
Carol M Robert
Elizabeth A Masaitis
Committee on Tax & Economic Growth
Harold Hochman
Fred McChesney
Thomas Borcherding
Delores T Martin
Dennis Dyer
George Minshew
Fred Panzer
Susan Stuntz
Peter Sparber
Carol Hrycaj
Debra Schoonmaker
Jeff Ross
Cal George
William Prendergast
Bill Orzechowski

Dominick Armentano
Burton A Abrams
Lee Alston
Ryan C Amacher
Gary Anderson
Lee Anderson
William Anderson
Terry Anderson
Scott E Atkinson
Roger Arnold
Richard W Ault
Michael Babcock
Joe A Bell
Bruce L Benson
Jean J Boddewyn
Peter Boettke
Thomas Borcherding
William J Boyes
Charles Breeden
Lawrence Brunner
Henry N Butler
Bill Bryan
Cecil Bohanon
John H Bowman
Dennis L Chinn
Morris Coates
Roger Congleton
Jeffrey R Clark
Michael Crew
Allan Dalton
John David
Michael Davis
Arthur T Denzau
Clifford Dobitz
John Dobra
Robert Ebel
Randall Eberts
Robert B Ekelund
Roger L Faith
David Fand
Susan Feigenbaum
Clifford Fry
Lowell Gallaway
Celeste Gaspari
David ER Gay
Kenneth V Greene
Kevin B Grier
Brian Goff
James D Gwartney
Sherman Hanna
Anne Harper-Fender
Kathy Hayes
Dennis Hein
James Heins
Robert Higgs
Richard Higgins
F Steb Hipple
Harold M Hochman
George E Hoffer
John Howe
Randall G Holcombe
William Hunter
Stephen Huxley
John D Jackson
Joseph M Jadlow
Cecil Johnson
Samson Kimenyi
David Klingaman
Roger Kormendi
Michael Kurth
David Laband
Sumner La Croix
Dwight R Lee
Dennis Logue
James E Long
C. Matt Lindsay
Donald P Lyden
Craig MacPhee
Mike Maloney
Michael L Marlow
Dolores Martin
Chuck Mason
Charles Maurice
Fred McChesney
James E McClure
Robert McCormick
William McEachern
Richard McKenzie
Robert McMahon
Arthur Mead
Paul L Menchik
John F Militello
William C Mitchell
Greg Neihaus
James A Papke
Allen Parkman
Mark Pauly
William Peterson
Harlan Platt
Michael D Pratt
Thomas Pogue
Barry W Poulson
Edward Price
Robert Pulsinelli
Raymond Raab
Roger Riefler
Terry Ridgeway
Mario Rizzo
Morgan Reynolds
Simon Rottenberg
Randy Rucker
Richard Saba
Todd Sandler
David Saurman
Mark Schmitz
Robert Sexton
Gordon O Shuford
William Shughart
Robert J Staaf
Thomas Stimson
Wendell Sweetser
Mark Thornton
Robert Tollison
Mark Toma
David G Tuerck
Gordon Tullock
Richard Vedder
Bruce Vermeullen
Richard Wagner
J Keith Watson
Burton Weisbrod
Walter E Williams
Daniel ('Dan') Williamson
Paul W Wilson
Thomas Wyrick
Bruce Yandle
Boon Yoon
Richard O Zerbe
Benjamin Zycher




Michael L Marlow     [ Prof]    

Michael Marlow worked for the tobacco industry, and was associated with their network of Public Choice economists.

While he performed services for Philip Morris, he was never formally listed as a member of the cash-for-comments economists network which was set up by Professor Robert Tollison with the lobbyist and consultant to the Tobacco Institute, James Savarese. The network's purpose was to provide propaganda and lobbying services to the tobacco industry in all 50 US States, utilizing trusted and prominent academic economists at the local universities. It was:

  • Funded and controlled by the Tobacco Institute.
  • Organised and influenced by the Center for the Study of Public Choice at George Mason University, and the Public Choice Society (neo-con economists).
  • Operated on a day-to-day basis through Ogilvy & Mather, and then by James Savarese & Associates a lobby firm based in Washington.
The principle organisers included the:
  • Tobacco Institute staffPeter Sparber, Susan Stuntz, Carol Hyrcaj, Fred Panzer, Jeff Ross and Calvin George.
  • Economist organizersRobert Tollison, William Shughart, Dwight Lee, Richard Wagner, Gary Anderson, Robert Ekelund, Henry Butler
  • Organizers from the GMU CenterAnna Tollison (wife of Robert), Elizabeth Masaitis, Carol Robert
  • Organizers from Savarese & Assoc. — Jim Savarese, Leslie Dalton, Kelleigh Varnum
  • Organisers from Ogilvy & MatherRichard Marcus, Marcia Silverman, Patricia Milita

It employed only Professors of economics at well-known State universities, and secretly commissioned them to:
  • Write op-ed articles for their local newspapers (after they had first been sub-edited and legally cleared by the Tobacco Institute). This earned them $2—3,000.
  • Appear as 'independent' witnesses at local ordinance hearings, or at State or Federal legislative hearings.
  • Make public statements to the broadcast or print media, or write letters to the editor supporting the tobacco industry's position [but concealing their connections]
  • Make submissions to academic/scientific conferences. This could earn them $5,000.
  • Write letters to their Congressmen; these letters had often been rough-drafted by the tobacco industry.
If they could claim to be a disinterested 'non-smoker' or even 'anti-smoking' — and " just a concerned citizen" expressing an expert academic opinion — this was seen as further enhancing their value in promoting the industry's positions and policies.

Some payments were laundered through Savarese & Associates, and some seem to have passed through the Center for the Study of Public Choice. Other means of hiding the sources of payment were probably via tobacco industry lawyers.

Some key documents

• Prof of Economics, Californian State Polytechnic University - San Luis, Obispo

1994 Aug: See the full outline of his involvement in creating the fake Alexis de Tocqueville ETS/EPA report written by S Fred Singer and Kent Jeffreys, secretly for the Tobacco Institute.

1992 June 15: William J Boyse and Michael L Marlow have conducted a study into "The Economics of Smoking Bans" and they want the funding to turn this into a book. Their study has all the appearances of being genuine research (unlike most of the funding proposals the tobacco industry received from its regular supporters).

The empirical focus of our study, in the sense of the original data collection, is on the City of San Luis Obispo, California, the first city to impose and then maintain an outright ban on smoking in all public places.

    The City imposed a ban on smoking in all enclosed public places late in the summer of 1990. Since then several communities ranging from Los Angeles to San Francisco have taken similar action. There are several distinguishing advantages to empirically investigating the experience of San Luis Obispo.
Among other expressions of disapproval, someone from the Tobacco Institute has written in the margins of the section dealing with the "illegality of smoking until age 18"
We wouldn't want to touch this, would we?
and they've heavily underlined
"Because non-smokers no longer must breathe second-hand smoke they experience gains in well being."

[There's something delightfully naive about academic economists thinking that the tobacco industry wanted genuine research of this kind]

    A few weeks later a memo to Jim Savarese from the Tobacco Institute, says:
This is in response to the proposal on "The Economics of Smoking Bans," submitted last June by William Boyes and Michael Marlow via Bob Tollison.

    In consultation with our State Activities Division, we have decided not to pursue this proposal. The preliminary data do not seem compelling enough from our point of view, and the proposal places what we believe is an inappropriate focus on health-related issues

    If you believe it would be worth continuing to pursue — that there may be some way to modify the Boyes/Marlow proposal or develop a proposal for a different study that would provide data that would be useful to us — I suggest that we sit down with the State Activities folks to get a better idea of what they're looking for.

1995: "The Economic Effects of Smoking Laws on Bars and Taverns" by Michael L Marlow of California Polytechniquc State University, San Luis Obispo,

    The paper openly admits that the study was done for Philip Morris Management Corporation. Naturally it finds what it was commissioned to find.
[In virtually every case, experience showed that his findings were totally wrong]:

  • The vast majority of restaurant owners believe that customers and employees are satisfied with smoking policies
  • Evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that some firm lose, some gain, and still others are unaffected by smoking laws.
  • While smoking laws exert differential effects, the majority of bars and taverns expect negative effects on profits and employment Over 82% of owners of bars and taverns predict that a restrictive smoking law will cause overall revenues to fall, while only about 2% predict that overall revenues will rise.
  • Net losses of 272,293 restaurant jobs, which corresponds to 9% of total jobs in this industry, follows from extrapolation of survey data. Net losses of 134,929 workers in the bar and tavern industry, or 44% of total jobs in this industry, follows from extrapolation of survey data. These numbers suggest that, as percentages of total work forces, net losses are expected to be roughly five-times higher in the bar and tavern industry than for the restaurant industry.



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